subsection. Main concepts are de ned in section 1. Section 2 shows our main results. Section 3 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
A. Related Literature
A growing literature studies whether strategic experts can avoid rejection (see, among several contributions, Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2008) , Al-Najjar, Smorodinsky, Sandroni and Weinstein (2010) , Babaio , Blumrosen, Lambert and Reingold (2011), Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006) , Chassang (2013) , Dekel and Feinberg (2006) , Feinberg and Stewart (2008) , Feinberg and Lambert (2014) , Fortnow and Vohra (2009) , Foster and Vohra (1998) , Fudenberg and Levine (1999) , Gradwohl and Salant (2011) , Gradwohl and Shmaya (2013) , Hu and Shmaya (2013) , Lehrer (2001) , Olszewski and Peski (2011) , Olszewski and Sandroni (2008,2009a-b) , Sandroni (2003) , Shmaya (2008) , Stewart (2011) , and Vovk and Shafer (2005) ). For a review, see Foster and Vohra (2013) and Olszewski (2011) .
Our contribution utilizes mathematical techniques of this literature, but presents novel aspects. One di erence is that our subject of analysis is the relationship between claim validation and testability. This motivation is not shared by any other paper we know of. The closest contribution to ours is Olszewski and Sandroni (2011), but their paper is not about claim validation. It is centered at the relationship between strict falsi cation and general falsi cation. In a follow-up paper (Pomatto, Al-Najjar and Sandroni (2014)), we analyze the connection between merging and testing opinions in a setting that rules out deterministic laws such as \all swans are white. " Chambers, Echenique and Shmaya (2013) study the relation between falsi ability and the axiomatization of economic theories.
Unlike most of the literature, we consider a framework that allows for nitely additive measures. This is essential to model the antithesis of claim validation, Humean skepticism. Finitely additive measures satisfy de Finetti's coherence principle (de Finetti (1974) ). Savage (1954) 's classic work imposes nite additivity, with additional restrictions. The relationship between nite additivity and inductive inference was formalized in Kelly (1996) . Our attention to incentives and strategic motives has no counterpart in Kelly's work. Gilboa and Samuelson (2012) show the positive e ect of subjectivity on inductive inference.
I. Basic Concepts
In every period, either 0 or 1 is observed. Let = f0; 1g 1 be the set of all possible paths. So, a path ! is an in nite sequence of outcomes. A path also expresses a general claim. If 1 is a white swan and 0 a non-white swan then the path (1; 1; 1; :::) is the statement that all swans are white. Given a path ! and a period t, let ! t be the cylinder of length t with base !, i.e., ! t are the paths that coincide with ! in the rst t periods. A cylinder ! t is the data available at time t along the path !. Let A be any algebra containing all cylinders and singletons f!g, for all ! 2 . Let ( ) be the set of all nitely additive probability measures (henceforth, measures) on ( ; A). 1 At period 0, a self-proclaimed expert, named Bob, delivers a measure P 2 ( ) to a tester named Alice.
By conditioning on the data available at period t, the measure P gives odds of future events. In addition, Bob may or may not express skepticism about deducing general claims from nite evidence. We now show that whether or not Bob expresses skepticism depends on the measure P that he communicates to Alice. DEFINITION 1: A measure P 2 ( ) validates claims if for every ! 2 ;
(1) lim
We denote by v ( ) the set of measures that validate claims. Consider the classic statement that \all swans are white," captured by the path 1 1 = (1; 1; :::). Consider a measure P that puts strictly positive probability on this path, i.e. P (f1 1 g) > 0. Then, after su ciently many white swans are observed, the statement \all swans are white" becomes a virtual certainty. Thus, multiple repetitions of white swans validate the conclusion that all swans are white. More generally, assume that the odds of t consecutive white swans do not become vanishingly small as t goes to in nity. Under claim validation, the probability that \all swans are white" converges to 1 as increasingly many white swans are observed.
Consider the case in which Bob asserts that 0 or 1 have equal odds in every period, conditional on any history (i.e., P corresponds to repeated tosses of a fair coin). In this example, the data ! t produced by any deterministic claim ! has vanishing probability as t goes to in nity. The premise of (1) does not hold and so, P validates claims. If a measure validates claims then the data produced by some deterministic claim (e.g., \all swans are white") must have bounded away from zero probability. We now show that while additivity is commonly perceived as a technical axiom, it has deeper meaning. REMARK 1: Any -additive measure P validates claims.
The main objective of this paper is to understand the role of claim validation. Thus, by Remark 1, measures must not be assumed, a priori, to be additive. In contrast, some nitely additive measures validate claims and some do not. Hence, nite additivity is the proper assumption for our purposes. We now sketch an example of a measure that does not satisfy claim validation, elaborating on de Finetti (1930) and Kelly (1996) . The technical details are in the Appendix. Let 1 t be a path where t consecutive white swans are followed by a non-white swan. Let P be a measure that assigns probability " 2 [0; 1] to the path 1 1 in which \all swans are white," probability 1 " to the event f1 t : t 1g where a non-white swan appears at an unspeci ed point, and zero probability to each path 1 t . 2 The measure has the property that no matter how many white swans are observed, a non-white swan may occur at an unspeci ed point, with non-vanishing probability. So, the conditional probability that \all swans are white" does not approach 1.
A. Empirical tests
Alice announces her test at period 0, before Bob announces his measure. Given a measure P and a path !, the test returns a pass when the measure is accepted and a fail when the measure is rejected.
The set A P = f! 2 : T (!; P ) = passg consists of all the paths deemed consistent with the announced measure P; while the rejection set R P = A P c are the paths that reject P . We only consider tests that are measurable, i.e. such that A P 2 A for every P 2 ( ). In a rejection test, the rejection set R P is a countable union of cylinders (for every measure P ). So, rejection tests reject in nite time. 3 Whenever appropriate, we require the test to be a rejection test. Fix 2 [0; 1) and let be a subset of ( ).
DEFINITION 3: A test -controls for type-I error with probability 1 if for any P 2 ,
A test controls for type-I error if Bob considers likely to pass the test by truthfully announcing a measure he believes in. Given any measure P and 2 (0; 1) there is a set of cylinders R P that have probability smaller than : Thus, Bob's measure P can be tested and rejected whether or not it validates claims. In the absence of incentives problems, probabilistic claims can be feasibly falsi ed by the data whether or not claims are validated. We now examine the role of claim validation when there are incentive problems.
B. Strategic forecasting
An uninformed expert may try to strategically pass the test. He may pick his measures at random, but among nitely many measures. 4 Let o ( ) be the set of measures with nite support on ( ). An element 2 o ( ) is an expert's strategy.
DEFINITION 4: A test T can be manipulated with probability p 2 [0; 1] if there is a strategy such that for every ! 2 ,
If a test is manipulable with high probability then an strategic expert is likely to pass the test, regardless of how the data unfolds and how much data is available.
DEFINITION 5: A rejection test T is non-manipulable if for every strategy there is a cylinder C such that for every path ! 2 C ,
A strategic expert cannot pass a non-manipulable test for some nite realization of the data. So, non-manipulable tests can discredit uninformed experts.
II. Main Results

THEOREM 1:
Consider the case where Bob can announce any measure in ( ). Let T be a test that ( ) controls for Type-I errors with probability 1 . The test T can be manipulated with probability 1 , for every 2 (0; 1 "].
THEOREM 2: Fix 2 (0; 1]. Consider the case where Bob's measure is required to validate claims. There exists a rejection test T that v ( ) controls for Type-I error with probability 1 and is non-manipulable.
Theorems 1 and 2 relate validation and falsi cation. Theorem 1 shows that if Bob can announce any measure (whether or not it validates claims) then he can strategically avoid rejection. It is nearly impossible to discredit him with any test that controls for type-I error, no matter how the data unfolds. This holds even if Alice could observe the entire in nite sequence of observations. Theorem 2 shows that if Bob is required to announce a measure that validates claims then he may be discredited, by some nite realization of the data.
These results show the transformative e ect of incentives in the understanding of scienti c methods. In the absence of incentive problems, any measure can be tested and rejected, even if they do not validate claims. Thus, claim validation is not essential to test and discredit honestly produced probabilistic claims. In contrast, in the presence of incentive problems, claim validation is relevant to discredit experts' probabilistic claims.
A. Intuition behind the Proofs
The proof of Theorem 1 combines Fan's (1953) Minmax, Banach-Alaoglu, and Riesz representation theorems. A test induces a zero-sum game between Nature and the expert, such that Nature's pure strategy is a path ! 2 and the expert's pure strategy is a measure P 2 ( ). The expert's payo is 1 if his measure is accepted and 0 otherwise. The set of (mixed) strategies are respectively ( ) and o ( ). For every mixed strategy of Nature, there exists a mixed strategy for the expert (to announce Nature's measure) that gives him an expected payo of 1 . So, if the conditions of Fan's (1953) minmax theorem are satis ed, the expert obtains an expected payo arbitrarily close to 1 , for all paths ! 2 . Fan's minmax theorem assumes (lower-semi) continuity of Nature's payo function and compactness of Nature's mixed strategy space. The Banach-Alaoglu theorem and Riesz representation theorem delivers a topology that satis es both conditions on ( ), but not necessarily on subsets of ( ), such as additive measures.
In the testing strategic experts literature, measures are typically required to be additive and impossibility results restrict Alice's tests (see, for example, Olszewski and Sandroni (2008) and Shmaya (2008) ). In contrast, in Theorem 1, there are no restrictions on tests (apart from control of type-I error).
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on a key property of measures that validates claims: for any such measure P it is unlikely that t P consecutive white swans, followed by a non-white swans, occur, for t P large enough. So, the measure P is rejected if a non-white swan appears after at least t P successive white swans (see Olszewski and Sandroni (2011) for a related point). This test is non-manipulable because all measures in the support of are rejected if a black swan appears after a long enough sequence of white swans.
The conclusions of the main results hold under weaker conditions. In Theorem 1, the assumption of a single test T can be relaxed. If Alice chooses randomly over di erent tests that ( )-control for Type-I errors, and the odds of the randomization are known to Bob, the expert can avoid rejection (see Theorem 12 in the online appendix). In Theorem 2, it is enough to impose claim validation with respect to one xed path. Fix a particular path! and say that a measure P validates claim! if (1) holds for path!. The proof of Theorem 2 shows that for every > 0 there exists a test that controls for type-I error with probability 1 for all measures that validate claim! and is non-manipulable.
III. Conclusion
Traditional concepts such as claim validation and falsi cation can be formally studied in the context of a prediction problem. In the absence of incentive considerations, claim validation and falsi cation are not strongly related because probabilistic claims can be tested and rejected whether or not they are validated by evidence. In contrast, if an expert may misrepresent what he knows then claim validation is relevant to potentially discredit uninformed experts' probabilistic claims. These results deliver an economic justi cation for claim validation. In the presence of incentive problems, claim validation plays a role in a critical function of science: the falsi cation of experts' probabilistic claims. conditional probability that \all swans are white" does not approach 1. To see this, note that
for every t, where the rst equality follows from Bayes' rule and the third equality follows from P (f1 : 1g) = P (f1 : tg) for each t. Therefore, P does not validate claims. The intuition behind Remark 2 is simple: Conditions (1) and (2) determine directly the probability of the set f1 t : t 0g and of each cylinder. Conditions (2) and (3) pin down the probability of each path. By additivity, we can derive the probability of all events in A s .
Algebras similar to A s are quite natural and su ces for de ning and interpreting the concept of claim validation. While the algebra A s is useful to construct simple examples, larger algebras may have some appeal because they require Bob to deliver predictions on more events.
A2. Proofs
PROOF OF REMARK 1:
Let P be -additive. Fix a path ! such that lim t!1 P ! t > 0. Because Shiryaev (1996) , p. 134). Therefore P (f!g) > 0 and P f!g j! t = P (f!g)
Hence, P validates claims.
Our results will apply a known isomorphism between the strategic manipulation of tests and a certain class of zero-sum games between Nature and the expert. Given a test T let A P : P 2 ( ) be the corresponding collection of acceptance sets and de ne the payo function V :
THEOREM 3 (Fan (1953) ): Let X and Y be convex subsets of two vector spaces. Let f : X Y ! R. If X is compact Hausdor and f is concave with respect to Y and convex and lower semi-continuous with respect to X then
f (x; y) (Equation (A1) can have the form 1 = 1. We refer the reader to Fan (1953) for a more general statement). In order to apply Fan's theorem we need to de ne a topology on ( ). We endow ( ) with the weak* topology. It can be de ned as the coarsest topology that makes the function P 7 ! P (E) continuous for every event E 2 A. Under this topology, ( ) is Hausdor . It follows from the Riesz representation theorem and the Banach-Alaoglu theorem that ( ) is compact (see Theorems IV.5.1 and V.4.2 in Dunford and Schwartz (1958) ). PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
Consider the function V : ( ) o ( ) ! [0; 1] de ned above. The set ( ) is convex and compact. For every strategy , the map P 7 ! V (P; ) is a convex combination of continuous functions, therefore it is continuous. Finally, the function V is a ne in each variable. All the conditions of Fan's Minmax theorem are veri ed, so we can conclude that (A2) min
By assumption, the test satis es P A P 1 for every P . Thus
where P (fP g) = 1. Fix > 0. By (A2) there exists a strategy 2 o ( ) such that V (P; ) > 1 for every P 2 ( ). In particular,
for every ! 2 , so the test can be manipulated with probability 1 . This concludes the proof. PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
We rst show that a measure P validates claims if and only if it satis es P ! t ! P (f!g) as t ! 1 for every path !. To this end, suppose P validates claims and x a path !. De ne = lim t!1 P ! t . If = 0 then P ! t # 0. Because P ! t P (f!g) for every t, then P (f!g) = 0 and P ! t ! P (f!g). Now consider the case where > 0. Since P validates claims, we have P f!g j! t ! 1. Hence
). Conversely, assume P satis es lim t!1 P ! t = P (f!g) for every path !. Then, lim t!1 P ! t > 0 if and only if P (f!g) > 0. In this case, by Bayes' rule, P f!g j! t ! 1 as t ! 1. Therefore, P validates claims. Fix 2 (0; 1) and a path!. For every measure P 2 v ( ) we have P ! t P (f!g) = P ! t f!g ! 0 as t ! 1 (notice that! t ! belongs to A for every t). Thus, for every P 2 v ( ) there exists a time t P such that P ! t P f!g < . For every P 2 v ( ) de ne the setR P =! t P fe !g. Consider the test T where for every P 2 v ( ) the setR P is the rejection set of P . By construction, the test v ( )-controls for Type-I error with probability 1
. We now show it is non-manipulable. Let (P 1 ; :::; P n ) be the support of a strategy . Choose a period t such that t t P i for i = 1; :::; n. Then
f!g is a union of cylinders. The proof is concluded by selecting, for every strategy , a cylinder C ! t f!g.
Let F be the collection of all nite unions of cylinders, together with the empty set. This is the algebra generated by all cylinders. Denote byÃ the algebra generated by F and the collection of all singletons. LEMMA 1: A set E belongs toÃ if and only if there exists a set F 2 F such that E 4 F is nite.
PROOF:
Let E be the collection of all sets E such that there exists an event F 2 F for which E 4 F is nite. By de nition, F Ã andÃ contains all singletons. Therefore E Ã . We now prove that E is an algebra. Clearly ; ; 2 E. If E 2 E and E 4 F is nite, because E c 4 F c = E 4 F and F c 2 F , then also E c belongs to E. Let E 1 ; E 2 2 E, and x F 1 ; F 2 2 F such that E 1 4 F 1 and E 2 4 F 2 are nite. Let E = E 1 [ E 2 and F = F 1 [ F 2 . Then E 4 F (E 1 4 F 1 ) [ (E 2 4 F 2 ). Hence E 4 F is nite. Thus, E is an algebra. Because it also contains all cylinders and all singletons,Ã E. HenceÃ = E.
Given an event E 2Ã, the set F 2 F such that E 4 F is nite is unique. To see this, suppose F 1 ; F 2 2 F are such that jE 4 F 1 j and jE 4 F 2 j are nite. Because F 1 4 F 2 = (E 4 F 1 ) 4 (E 4 F 2 ), F 1 4 F 2 is nite. Because the two sets are unions of nite cylinders, F 1 = F 2 . We denote by F E the unique event in F such that E 4 F E is nite. PROOF OF REMARK 2:
De ne on the algebra F a measure Q as Q (F ) = 1 if 1 2 F and Q (F ) = 0 otherwise. Now, de ne on the larger algebraÃ the measure R as R (E) = Q (F E ). For all E 1 ; E 2 2Ã, F E 1 [E 2 = F E 1 [ F E 2 and if E 1 \ E 2 = ; then F E 1 \ F E 2 = ;. 5 From these properties it follows that R is a well de ned measure. In particular,
The sets F E 1 nE 1 and F E 2 nE 2 are nite. So, if E 1 \ E 2 = ;, then F E 1 \ F E 2 is nite, hence is the empty set.
